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REFERENCES 121. MOTIVATION
Standard Keynesian theory states that fiscal expenditure should impact positively
output in the short run. However, there is some evidence concerning developed
economies that reports non keynesian results for fiscal policy in the short run, i.e.
expansionary fiscal contractions (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990,1995).
The literature on the expectational effect of fiscal policy (for example Bertola and
Drazen 1993 and Sutherland 1995) can explain this result. In this view, a credible fiscal
contraction will change expectations about the future of fiscal policy. In effect, a
permanent reduction of government consumption to GDP will anticipate a future
reduction in taxes and government debt that increases permanent income, consumption
and output in the short run. In this scenario, fiscal deficit may act as a signal which
determines private expenditure and output.
This study presents further evidence about the lack of effectiveness of fiscal
policy over GDP as developed in the traditional keynesian framework. We use a
structural VAR approach, a widely used econometric tool in the literature on the
dynamic effects of fiscal policy, but generally carried out for developed economies. This
study analyzes the case of an emerging economy.
2. THE DATA
As a case of fiscal policy changes in emerging economies, we study Chile, using
annual data for fiscal policy and national accounts from 1833 to 2000
1. This study
considers three variables: government expenditure, tax revenue and GDP.
The sample used allows us to address a number of episodes related to the Chilean
fiscal policy. In particular, this sample covers a period involving tax reforms, changes in
tax incomes driven by the economic cycle and changes in the government size, measured
                                                                
1 Source Jofré et al (2000).2 IS FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVE?
by government expenditure over GDP. For instance, data represented in figure 1A show
that the ratio government expenditure to GDP reached levels close to 20% only in late
1960s, rising up to 35% in early 1970s and declining afterwards, given the change in
both the political and economic regimes. This scenario is partially reversed from early
1990s, when a new political regime takes place.
In turn, figure 1B shows both fiscal expenditure and tax revenue in the last four
decades, being clearly displayed effects coming from tax reforms and economic crises
over fiscal incomes. This figure shows positive fiscal balances from mid-1970s, despite
the sharp increase in government expenditure from early 1990s. This outlook was only
reversed by the impact of both the early 1980s and late 1990s crises, mainly because of
their negative impact over tax incomes.
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Table 1 shows the unit root tests (ADF, PP, DF-GLS) for each series. To choose
the lags on the ADF y DF-GLS tests, we use the Akaike criteria. In the tests, when the
variables are in levels, we include a constant and a time trend, while when the variables
are in first differences, we include only a constant. The results indicate that in general,
the series are integrated of order one.4 IS FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVE?
TABLE 1: UNIT ROOT TESTS, 1833-2000
Critical values Test values Serie Critical values Test values Serie Critical values Test values Serie
ADF 1%, -4.01 -2.98 I(1) 1%, -4.01 -3.40 I(1) 1%, -4.01 -5.05 I(0)
5%, -3.44 5%, -3.44 5%, -3.44
PP 1%, -4.01 -2.46 I(1) 1%, -4.01 -3.20 I(1) 1%, -4.01 -4.97 I(0)
5%, -3.44 5%, -3.44 5%, -3.44
DF-GLS 1%, -3.50 -2.36 I(1) 1%, -3.50 -3.11 I(0) 1%, -3.50 -4.69 I(0)
5%, -2.97 5%, -2.96 5%, -2.96
ADF 1%, -3.47 -9.08 I(0) 1%, -3.47 -8.42 I(0) 1%, -3.47 -9.21 I(0)
5%, -2.88 5%, -2.88 5%, -2.88
PP 1%, -3.47 -12.52 I(0) 1%, -3.47 -15.40 I(0) 1%, -3.47 -26.47 I(0)
5%, -2.88 5%, -2.88 5%, -2.88
DF-GLS 1%, -2.58 -8.88 I(0) 1%, -2.58 -13.09 I(0) 1%, -2.58 -14.33 I(0)







3. THE STRUCTURAL VAR
Our goal is to identify the impact on GDP of an exogenous and unexpected
change in fiscal policy. To do so, we estimate a SVAR with annual data. We carefully
identify exogenous and unexpected fiscal policy changes on the residuals of the SVAR.
The reasons to focus on this methodology are twofold:
1. It seems possible to identify fiscal shocks. In fact, the movements of government
spending are determined by policy decisions, among which the stabilization of
the GDP is less predominant (interest rate is the instrument most widely used to
stabilize GDP). From this point of view, exogenous fiscal shocks with respect to
the movement of GDP exist and could be identified.
2. The lags of  fiscal policy suggest that there is a weak or null response of current
fiscal policy to unexpected movements of economic activity. This will allow us to
identify the fiscal shocks.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 292 5
3.1. The system
Let X t be a vector of endogenous variables including GDP (Y t), government
spending (G t) and government revenue (Tt). Hence we write the following reduced form








Where t indexes time, X t ” [  DGt  DYt  DTt ]´ and U t is residual vector defined as
Ut ” [gt  yt tt]´, (gt  yt tt) being  the residuals of the above system. The number of lags, K,
was set equal to 2, by means of the Akaike criteria.
We hypothesize that the government revenue residuals and government spending
residuals (tt,gt) depends on three factors:
1. Automatic response to the economy’s shocks, captured by the residuals of the
GDP equation.
2. Response to unexpected government spending shocks, denoted as et
g
3. Exogenous and unexpected changes in government revenue, denoted as et
t
Thus, we will assume the following structure determining the government
revenue and spending residuals:
(2a) tt = a1yt + a2et
g + et
t
(2b) gt = b1yt + b2et
t + et
g
Next, we assume that the GDP shock will depend on an exogenous supply shock,
et
y, in addition to the fiscal shocks, as in:
(2c) yt = c1tt + c2gt + et
y6 IS FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVE?
3.2. Identification of the system




y) plus the associated coefficients (a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2). The system of
equations (2a)-(2c) might be identified by noting that from the estimation of (1) we have
available the variables (gt  yt tt). The steps are the following:
1. To identify a1 or b1 we will run 2SLS on (2a) and (2b) using changes on terms of
trade as an instrument for yt. Denote those estimators as  11 ˆ ˆ a,b . We choose terms
of trade because it is a variable that generally impacts GDP in an open economy
like Chile and it does not depend on exogenous changes in fiscal policy.
2. We next define  tt1ttt1t ˆ ttay,ggby =-=- % % % . Using those definitions and (2a), (2b),
we get  g
t2t22 t gbte(1ab) =+- % % .  As  tt t,g % % are constructed and known variables, we
identify this equation by running 2SLS, using as instrument for  t t %  the timing of
tax reform in Chile.
3. The residual obtained in step 2, 
g
t e ˆ , is used as a proxy of 
g
t e in equation (2a),
which is rewritten as in  g t tt1t2 tt ˆˆ ttayae  e  =-=+ % . We will run this equation by
OLS to obtain the estimates  t 2 t ˆˆ (a,e)  .
4. Finally, to identify (c1, c2), we will run equation (2c) by 2SLS using  g t
tt ˆˆ (e,e) as
instruments for (tt, gt).
The results of this procedure are shown in table 2. Notice that equations (2a)-(2c)
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATION OF (a1, b 1, c1, a2, b 2, c2)















** Indicates parameter is significant at 5% confidence.
From these results, it follows that a 1% exogenous shock to fiscal expenditure
produces a –0.17% current decrease on GDP, while a 1% shock on tax revenue produces
a -0.06% current decrease on GDP.
3.3. Impulse-Response functions and confidence intervals
































































This is a useful representation, as we can easily obtain the impulse-response
functions, IRt, as in:
(4) t1 t IR FQ - =
To calculate the confidence intervals, we follow Runkle (1987), by using a
boostrapping approach. The procedure is to run our SVAR and to obtain the fitted
residuals,  { } 12T ˆˆˆ e,e,...,e  and the estimated coefficients ( ) ˆ ˆ , FQ , where T is the sample
size. Next, we draw a random sample of size T from our fitted residuals, where for each
observation of our random sample each residual has a (1/T) chance of being chosen. We
then use this residual random sample to construct an artificial sample as in:
i i it1 t t
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ xxu FQ - =+
where 
i
t u  is the residual random sample and 
i
t x ˆ  is the artificial simple. We next re-
estimate the SVAR to obtain a new impulse-response function,
i
t R Iˆ . We repeat thisDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 292 9
procedure 10.000 times, which allows us to calculate the standard deviation, and thus,
the confidence intervals of the impulse-response function.
4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Figures 3 to 8 show the response in a 10-year horizon to fiscal expenditure and
tax revenue shocks. The three figure on the left show the response to the expenditure
shock while the three figure on the right show the response to a tax revenue shock. The
confidence intervals rely upon a 5% confidence.
FIGURES 3-8: RESPONSE OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES TO EXOGENOUS
SHOCKS IN FISCAL POLICY10 IS FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVE?DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 292 11
The figures show that a 1% fiscal expenditure shock produces a negative impact
on GDP on the first year of approximately -0.2%. The latter impacts are non significant.
Similarly, a 1% tax revenue shock is associated with a decline of -0.1% on GDP on the
first year, while there are no latter significant impacts.
These results contradict the expected impacts of fiscal variables on GDP from
standard Keynesian theory. Recent literature has stressed the possibility of a negative
impact of fiscal shocks on economic activity.  In fact, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and
Perotti (2002) report negative multiplier effects on OECD countries in the period post-
1980. Our study reports further evidence on an emerging economy. These results are in
line with the literature that focus on the impact of fiscal policy on individual´s
expectations, which may produce non Keynesian effects  (Bertola y Drazen 1993,
Giavazzi y Pagano 1990 y 1995, Giavazzi, Jappelli y Pagano 2000). In fact, if a fiscal
adjustment affects individual´s expectations about future fiscal policy, the current fiscal
adjustment may positively impact individual´s expenditure and thus GDP, while if there
is an increase on fiscal expenditure, individuals may anticipate larger taxes on the future,
reducing permanent income and thus, private expenditure and GDP.12 IS FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVE?
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